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306 PEoPLE v. PEETE [28 C.2d 
[Crim. No. 4673. In Bank. June 7,1946.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. LOUISE PEE'fE, Appellant. 
[1] Criminal Law - Evidence - Other Crimes. - Except when it 
shows merely criminal disposition, evidence that is relevant 
is not excluded because it reveals the commission of an offense 
other than that charged. 
[2J 1I0micfde-Evidence-Other Crimes.-Evidence of defendant's 
conduct in connection with a prior murder, which was similar 
in significant respects to her conduct in connection with the 
murder charged, was admissible to prove that the murder 
charged was committed in the execution of a scheme or plan 
to acquire property by murder. 
[8] ld. - Instructions - Motive.-In a murder case in which the 
court had admitted in evidence the circumstances surrounding 
a previous murder for which defendant had been convicted, 
the court properly instructed the jury that those circum-
stances, which showed that the purpose of the prior offense 
was to acquire the victim's property, tended to pruve that 
defendant had a motive for the second murder and served 
to rebut the defense that decedent had been killed by her 
husband. 
[4J ld.-Instructions-ldentity.-In a murder case in which the 
court had admitted in evidence the circumstances surround-
ing a previous murder for which defendant had been con-
victed, the court properly instructed the jury that those cir-
CUUlstances tended to identify defendant as the perpetrator 
of the murder charged, especially where the murderer's method 
of killing was the same in both cases. 
[5] ld. - Evidence - Other Crimes.-In a prosecution for murder, 
evidence concerning defendant's explanation of her unusual 
conduct in connection with a previous murder, which explana-
tion aided in het conviction of that murder, was admissible as 
tenning to prove the falsity of her present explanation that her 
similar unusual conduct was designed to obviate suspicion that 
might be engendered by her criminal record. 
(2J See 13 Cal.Jur. 704; 26 Am..Jv. 39B. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 393(2); [2] Homi-
cide, §103; [3] Homicide, §179; [4] Homicide, §193; [5] Homi-
cide, § 102; [6J Criminal Law, § 1469; [7] Witnesses, § 232(1); 
(B] Criminal Law, § 13B2 (14); [9] Witnesses, § 232(4); [10J Crinl-
inal Law, § 1377; [11] Homicide, § 107. 
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[6] Criminal Law-Successive Crimes-Proceedings Where Prior 
Convictions Admitted.-Pen. Code, §§ 1025, 1093, which pro-
hibit the reading of or alluding to an admitted charge of a 
previous conviction, were not designed to exclude relevant 
evidence nor to prevent impeachment of 1\ witness by proof 
of conviction of a felony. 
[1] Witnesses-Impeachment-Conviction of Felony-Proof. - In 
a prosecution for murder, the judgment roll of a prior trial 
in which defendant was convicted of murder was admissible 
in evidenee to impeach ber testimony. (Code Civ. Proe., 
§ 2051.) 
[8] Criminal Law-Appeal-Rarmless and Reversible Error-Evi-
dence.-In a prosecution for murder in which defendant ad-
mitted a prior conviction of murder, she was not prejudiced by 
the introduction of the record of proceedings preceding the 
previous judgment where the record of those proceedings 
added little to the information related in the judgment. 
[9] Witnesses-Impeachment-Conviction of Felony-Cross-exam-
ination of Accused.-In a prosecution for murder the fact that 
a previous conviction of murder was affirmed on appeal may 
be shown by eross-examination of defendant to impeach her. 
(Code Civ. Proc., ~ 2051.) 
[10] Criminal Law - Appeal- Harmless and Reversible Error-
Witnesses-Cross-examination.-In a prosecution for murder 
in which defendant admitted a prior conviction of murder, 
any error in cross-examining defendant concerning her state-
ment that she was prevented by force from testifying in the 
prior prosecution could not have been prejudicial where her 
testimony tended to rnitiJrate the effect of the prior conviction. 
[11] Romicide-Evidence-Rearsay-Declarations of Deceased.-
In a murder case, deceased's verified petition, executed in con-
nection with her husband's commitment to an institution for 
the insane, was hearsay and inadmissible to prove the truth 
of recitals that he had threatened to kill deceased and himself. 
APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code. § 1239) 
from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 
County and from an order denying a new trial. Harold 
B. Landreth, Judge. Affirmed. 
[6]8ee 8 Oal.Jur. 646; 26 Am.Jur. 400. 
[9] Right to cross-examine accused as to previous prosecution 
for, or conviction of, crime, for purpose of affecting his credibility, 
Dote, 6 A.L.R. 1608 j 25 ld. 339, 
) 
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Prosecution for murder. Judgment imposing death pen-
alty affirmed. 
Frederic H. Vercoe, Public Defender, and William B. 
Neeley, Deputy Public Defender, for Appellant. 
Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, Frank Richards, 
Deputy Attorney General, Fred N. Howser, District Attorney, 
and John Barnes, Deputy District Attorney, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-An information was filed against de-
fendant by the District Attorney of Los Angeles County, 
charging her with the murder of Margaret R. Logan. The 
jury found defendant guilty of murder in the first degree 
and made no recommendation as to punishment. Defendant 
admitted a charge of a previous conviction of murder and 
serving a term therefor. The trial court denied her mo-
tion for a new trial. This appeal is automatic from the 
judgment imposing the death penalty. 
Defendant was convicted in 1921 of the murder of Jacob C. 
Denton. On June 2, 1920, approximately two weeks after. 
defendant had leased his residence, Denton disappeared. De-
fendant answered inquiries as to his whereabouts with various 
statements: that he had been shot in the arm by an unknown 
"Spanish woman"; that he was avoiding his residence because 
he was ashamed of his wound; that his arm had been ampu· 
tated; that he had gone to one or another part of the country; 
that he wanted to conceal his affairs from his family and ac-
quaintances. She also stated that he had given her a bill of 
sale to his automobile; that he permitted her to open his mail; 
that he atuhorized her to sell his house and accept the :first 
payment. Defendant rented the Denton residence to a third 
party, forged Jacob Denton's name to a lease,had deiilings------
for the sale of the residence, drew forged checks against 
Denton's bank account, attempted to gain entrance to his 
safety deposit box, went through his papers, pawned his dia-
mond rings, explaining that she gave the proceeds to the 
"Spanish w()man," gave away some of his clothing and had 
some made over for her daughter, and attempted to discourage 
search for him. On September 23, 1920, Denton's body was 
found buried under his residence. A bullet had entered the 
back of the neck at the fourth cervical vertebra and severed 
the spinal cord. causing instant death. The decomposed state 
) 
June 1946] PEOPLE tI. PEETE 
[28 C.2d 306: 169 P.2d 924) 
309 
of the body indicated that be was killed about the time 
of his disappearance. Although defendant did not testify,· 
she made a lengthy explanation to a deputy district attor-
ney of her conduct after Denton's disappearance, which 
was discredited. 
Following her conviction, defendant spent eighteen years 
in the state penitentiary. During and following her impris-
onment, she told a number of persons that she expected to 
acquire a valuable estate or "trust fund" in the near f'lture. 
The evidence shows that these statements were false, aud that 
defendant was impecunious. The evidence also indicates that 
after her release in 1939 she procured a revolver by theft. 
In November, 1943, she was engaged by Mrs. Logan, whom 
she had known many years, for domestic service and care of 
Arthur Logan, who was then 73 years of age and in a state 
of senile dementia. Arthur Logan was committed to an insti-
tution for the insane early in November, 1943, on petition 
filed by his wife. Defendant aided Mrs. Logan in securing 
this commitment. Mrs. Logan regretted her action and he was 
paroled later that month to her care. Mrs. Logan gave de-
fendant two letters in November, 1943, for use in connection 
with her husband's release, which stated that defendant was 
her "foster sister." Defendant retained these letters until 
they were found on her person at the time of her arrest 
thirteen months later. . . 
On March 19, 1944, Mrs. Logan placed her husband in a 
private sanitarium for one week. The records of the sani-
tarium reveal that Mr. Logan was unruly and noisy on oc-
casions, but was not dangerously violent. Testimony was 
given that Mrs. Logan's purpose in placing him in the 
sanitarium was to have him cared for while she worked at 
an aircraft factory. 
Before Mrs. Logan's'death on May 29,1944, defendant pur-
ported to finance through a trust fund a $50,000 real estate 
purchase by herself and Mrs. Logan, the property to be held 
in joint tenancy. She failed to Qbtain the $2,000 escrow de-
posit, and the decedent procured the sum by pledging her 
savings account. After Mrs. Logan's death, the escrow period 
expired with the purchase price remaining unpaid, and de-
fendant obtained one half of the deposit by forging the 
decedent's name to an instrument giving defendant the power 
of attorney for decedent. Earlier, on May 19, 1944, defendant 
) 
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forged a check for $200 drawn on Mrs. Logan's checking 
account, and deposited the check in an account held jointly 
with her husband. A cashier, however, discovered the forgery 
and notified Mrs. Logan, who directed him to charge the sum 
to her account and reassured him that the forger would repay 
the obligation. Defendant wal> unable to do so, however, until 
two days after Mrs. Logan'8 death, when she made partial 
payment with funds appropriated from a refund of money 
paid for railroad ticket8 by decedent. 
On May 2, 1944, defendant secretly married and moved to a 
nearby hotel. She did not reveal her criminal record to her 
husband. She told severa] people during that month that Mr. 
Logan was having dangerous fits of violence. She stated to 
Olle witness that "One morning you are going to wake up and 
read "the headlines in the paper of a terrible tragedy," but 
repeatedly asked the witness not to mention her statement 
to Mrs. Logan. Defendant was at the Logan home on May 29, 
1944, the date of the decedent'8 disappearance and death. 
Two days later, she and her husband moved into the Logan 
home. On or about .Tune 1. 1944. on the pretext that 1\1rs. 
Logan had been seriously injured in an automobile accident, 
defendant induced Arthur Logan to accompany her to a pro-
bation officer. 011 the basis of defendant's statements that 
she was Ml'8. Logan '!o: .. f ostel" sister." and that in an insane 
rage, ArthUl' Logan had attaekeiJ his wife. bitten her on the 
neck and nose, and had bitten defendant on the hand, he was 
sent to the psychopathic ward of a count~· hospital. and later 
to the Patton State Hospital. Defendant did not mention to 
the probation officer that Mrs. l,OgaIl had been shot. De-
fendant forged Mrs Logan 'f; name to subsequent corre-
spondence with the Patton authorities. Arthur [,ogan be-
came increasingly ill and died on December 6, ]944. At 
defendant's direction. hi!> body was given to a medical IIchool 
for scientifie purposes.1 
In response to inquiries as to Mrs. Logan's whereabouts, 
defendant reiterated her statement as to an attack by Arthur 
Logan, adding that Mrs. Logan had gone to an institution for 
plastic surgery, and that because she was self-conscious about 
the disfigurement caused b~' t11e attack, she did not want any of 
her friends to see her. Defendant stated on various occasions 
that Mrs. Logan had gone to Santa Monica, San Bernardino, 
Oregon, "inland," Denver, "back east.," and New York; that 
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no longer desired the personalty in the home and had told 
her to do what she wanted with it; that Mrs. Logan did not 
want her car and that defendant had but one more paper 
to sign and it would be hers; and that Mrs. Logan intended 
never to return to her home. 
Defendant lived with her husband ill thc Logan residence 
from May 31, 1944, to December 20, 1944, the .date of her 
arrest. During this period, she had some of Mrs. Logan's 
clothing made over to fit herself, opened Mrs. Logan's mail, 
and when necessary answered it in Mrs. Logan's name, had 
the interior of the house repainted and various articles of 
furniture remodeled, paid incidental bills, gave away and 
loaned fine articles of personalty, promised her relatives 
Mrs. Logan's diamonds, sold an electric mangle, and used 
the Logan car, gas coupons, and food stamps. 
Shortly after Arthur Logan's death defendant obtained 
forms necessary to make a neath claim for $1,425 owing on 
his life insurance policy, and sent them to the Patton au· 
thorities with a letter of instruction on which she forged 
Mrs. Logan's name. After her arrest, two deeds of gift 
that purported to give the Logan property to her were 
found in a suitcase under her bed. Defendant t2Stified that 
the deeds had been drafted in good faith by her husband 
because he felt insecure since they were occupying the 
property neither as owners nor as tenants. 
It was Mrs. Logan's duty to file monthly parole reports on 
defendant's conduct. Defendant wrote all parole reports 
from June to December, 1944, and forged 'Margaret Logan'fi 
name thereto. Suspicion arose as to their authenticity, and 
she was taken into cu .. <;tody on December 20, 1944. At the 
time of ber arrest, defendant was going through Mrs. Logan'!' 
papers. She gave the arresting officers the same explanation 
of the decedent's absence that she had previously givell 
others. After a brief search the body of Mrs. Logan waf; 
found in a shallow grave in the back yard of the Logan resi· 
(lence. Defendant had placed a high, solid gate between the 
garage and the corner of the house that prevented passage or 
view from the driveway to the back yard. The autopsy re· 
"caled that a bullet had entered the back of the ncr1\- Imd 
:-;truck the fourth cervical vertebra, narrowly missing the 
spinal cord, and had passed out of the body below the lcft 




Defendant testified that Mrs. Logan was killed by Arthur 
Logan in an insane rage on May 29, 1944. She admitted that 
the explanation that she had given for Mrs. Logan's disap-
pearance was false, but explained that her conduct after 
May 29, 1944, was designed to conceal the death to obviate 
suspicion that would be east on her because of her criminal 
record. A witness testified that Arthur Logan had bruised 
his wife on a previous occasion, and that Mrs. Logan stated 
that he was "hard to handle." Defendant testi1ied that at 
about 2 o'clock in the afternoon of May 29, 1944, she ran into 
the Logan living room in answer to an urgent call from Mrs. 
Logan, and found Mr. Logan struggling with and biting his 
wife; that the latter was bleeding profusely from wounds 
under her eyes, at the end of her nose, and in her neck; that 
she later found a piece of flesh that looked like a part of Mrs. 
Logan's nose. Examination of Mrs. Logan's body revealed 
minor abrasions but no evidence of biting or other injury to 
the face or neck. Testimony was given that Arthur Logan had 
no natural teeth, and was very feeble and in poor health, as 
contrasted to Mrs. Logan, who was ten years his junior and a 
strong, heavy woman. Defendant further stated that Arthur 
Logan was enraged because he thought he was about to be 
sent to an institution for the insane; that after separating 
the Logans, defendant refrained from calling the police at 
Mrs. Logan's request; that Arthur Logan procured a steak 
hammer from the kitchen and struck his wife on the face 
and head with it; that she and Mrs. Logan sank to the floor. 
she holding the victim's head; that later she sent Mr. Lo-
gan to the back· poreb, locking him out, on the pretext of 
his watching for Mr. Butler. who was to call for the iron-
ing mangle; that later she heard voices and went to the 
door, spoke to Mr. Butler and gave him the mangle. Mr. 
Butler's testimony that he telephoned defendant concerning 
the mangle severa] days before he called for it and that de-
fendant then informed him that Mrs. Logan had been in an 
accident. indicated that when he later called for the mangle 
Mrs. L-ogan bad already been dead several days. He testi· 
fied further that he walked to the front door of the residenc(' 
and rang the bell; that a voice from the front bedroom told 
him that he would find the mangle outside the back porch 
and that nothing else was said; that be saw no one in tlH' 
back yard and no one came to the back door. 
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"both the normal and the ahnormal thing"; that she read-
mitted Mr. Logan; that he again "flicked" Mrs. Logan's 
head with the steak hammer; that later Mr. Logan came out 
of a bedroom brandishing the defendant's revolver, and 
struck Mrs. Logan with it; that defendant then raised Mrs. 
Logan from the floor; that the revolver fell to the floor, Mr. 
Logan again struck his wife with the steak hammer, and she 
again fell to the floor; that defendant, whose clothing was 
bloody, now feared calling the police or neighbors, although 
Arthur Logan was also covered with blood, and was still 
acting in an insane manner; that because blood was coming 
out of Mrs. Logan's mouth, defendant turned her 80 that she 
lay face down; that Mr. Logan again struck his wife; that 
defendant then heard several shots; that defendant was 
"paralyzed" at this time in a "semi-kneeling" position. 
Defendant's testimony that she heard several shots was COll-
trary to evidence that after careful search only one bullet 
was found, imbedded in the wall 38% inches from the floor. 
Although defendant testified that the decedent was shot by 
her husband from a standing position, no bullet hole or ri-
cochet mark was found in the rug or floor where, according 
to her testimony, the shooting occurred. Expert testimony 
was given that because carbon particles were found two 
inches within the bullet wound, the gun must have been 
placed against the decedent's neck when fired. Although de-
fendant testified that Mr. Logan struck his wife several times 
with the steak pounder, no marks on the skull of deceased 
that might have been made by the conical knobs on the in-
strument were found. Blood and human hair were found, 
however, on the revolver, and the butt of the weapon, which 
contained a defect, fitted perfectly into the two depressed 
fractures of the skull that were the cause of death. 
Defendant testified that after the decedent was shot, she 
telephoned a doctor to learn how to quiet Mr. Logan, and 
following his advice, gave Mr. Logan four sleeping tablets. 
The doctor testified that although he did not recall the con-
versation, he would not in any case have ordered such a dose_ 
Defendant stated that Mrs. Logan, who because of defendant'!' 
fear for her own safety had received no medical attention, 
died at 8 o'clock in the evening, and that having determined 
to conceal her death, defendant washed the blood off Arthur 
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the body in the back yard. Concerning the probability that 
Mr. Logan would have absolved her had he killed his wife in 
an insane rage. rlefendant stated that Mr. Logan did not 
remember what occurred during hi8 attack:,; of violence. 
Other witnesses testified that although forgetful, he remem-
bered past social affairs and important current events. 
The prosecution'~ theory was that the jury could infer 
from the foregoing evidence that before the Denton murder 
defendant conceived a scheme whereby she could gain wealth 
by finding a 'Iuitable victim and acquiring his property by 
mnrder; that although the execution of the scheme was 
thwarted in the Denton ease. her false statement." while in 
prison concerning her prospective wealth were designed to 
forestall suspicion that might arise !ilhould she succeed after 
parole in a new attempt that she contemplated: that similar 
statements. and also statementl'l that Arthur IJogan wal' be-
coming increasingly violent, made to neighbor!' and friends 
of the Logans before the date of the present tragedy. were 
designed to lay the groundwork for an attempt to acquire the 
Logan property by murdering Mrs. Logan and procuring t.he 
recommitment of Arthur Logan; that defendant's inability to 
procure fund~ for the escrow deposit in the real estate trans-
action or to repay the amount of the forged check in all prob-
abilit;r indicated to Mm. [Jogan that defendant'~ financing of 
the real estate purchase was fictitious: t.hat the power in Mm. 
Logan'R hands to report that defendant had. by committing 
the forgery, violated her parole, and to recommend that she 
be sent back to the penitentiary was an additional motive 
for murder; that on May 29, 1944. defendant in all prob-
ability gave Arthur Logan the sleeping tablets before the ' 
murder. and after he had thus been disposed of. shot the un-
suspecting Mm. Logan from behind at close range in an at-
tempt to sever the spinal cord; but that realizing from the 
--- Victimi~-actions that she' had missed her mark, -defendant 
fractured her skull b)' two blow~ with the butt of the revolver. 
Defendant concedes the sufficiency of the e\'idence to sus-
tain the verdict. She contends, however. that there is a gen-
eral rule against the admissibility of evidence concerning 
prior crimes, and that evidence concerning the Denton murder 
does not fit into any "exception." [1] It is settled in this 
state, however. that except when it shows merely criminal 
disposition (People v. Cook, 148 Cal. 334, 340 [83 P. 43]; 
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that iN relevant is not excluded because it reveals the com-
mission of an offense other than that charged. "The general 
tests of the admissibility of evidence in a criminal case are: 
•.. does it tend logically, naturally, and by reasonable in-
ference, to establish any fact material for the people, or to 
overcome any material matter sought to be proved by the 
defense 1 If it does, then it i~ admis..'1ible, whether it em-
braces the commi~sion of another crime or does not, whether 
the other crime be similar in kind or not, whether it be part 
of a single design or not." (People v. Sanders, 114 Cal. 216, 
230 [46 P. 153]: People v. Morani, 196 Cal. 154, 157 r236 
P. 135]; People v. Nakis, 184 Cal. 105, 114 [193 P. 921; People 
v. Cook, 148 Cal. 334. 340-342 [83 P. 43]; People v. Suesser, 
142 Cal. 354, 363 [75 P. 1093]: PeOl)le v. Wilson, 117 Cal. 
688, 69] [49 P. 1054]; People v. Craig, 111 Cal. 460, 468 [44 
P. 1861: People v. Tucker. 104 Cal. 440, 442 183 P 195]; 
People v. Lane, 101 Cal. 513, 517 [36 P. 16]; People v. Rogers 
71 Cal. 565. 567 [12 P. 6791: People v. McGilver, 67 Cal. 55, 
56 [7 P. 49J: People v. Cunningham, 66 Cal. 668, 671 [4 P. 
1144, 6 P. 700. 846] : Peoplf: \'. 'Fitzgerald, 14 Cal.App.2d 180, 
202 158 P.2d 7181: People \'. Foster, 79 Cal.App. 328, 333 
[24!l P. 2311: Pf'.Ople v. Revley, 67 Cal.App. 553, 562 [227 P. 
!l57]: People \'. Klopfer, 61 Ca1.App. 291. 294 [214 P. 878]; 
People v. Kisp1'. 22 Cal.App. 10. 15 [133 P. 516, 134 P. 346]; 
People v. 1'ornalt1/. 14 Cal.App. 224. 233-234r 111 P. 513]; 
Pe,ople v. Rnmla.nd. 12 Cal.App. 6, 19 [106 P. 4281: People v. 
"1('.Pher.~on. 6 Cal. App. 266. 270 r91 P. 1098]; see cases cited, 
~ Cal..Jur 60. 13 Cal.Jur. 703: Fricke. California Criminal 
Evidence. 215: ]3 So.CaI.L.Re'\·. 511. 51a: 2~ Cal.L.Rev. 516: 
Rtone. The Rule of Exclusion of Sim~1ar Fact Evidence: 
England, 46 Harv.L.Rev. 954: Stone. The-Rule -ot- Exclusion 
of Sim.ilar 'Fact Evidence: America, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 988.) 
"It i~ true that in trying a person charged with one offense 
it iR ordinarily inadmissible to offer proof of another and dis-
tinct offense. but thh~ i~ only because the proof of a distinct 
offense ha~ ordinarily no tendency to establish the offense 
rharged. But whenever the case is such that proof of one 
crime t.end~ to prove any fact material in the trial of another, 
surh proof is admissible, and the fact that it may tend to 
prejudice the defendant in the minds of the jurors is no 
p:l'onnd for its exclusion." People v. Walters, 98 Cal. 138, 141 
[32 P. 864]; People v. Ellis, 188 Cal. 682, 689 [206 P. 753) i 
) 
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People v. Ebanks, 117 Cal. 652, 663 [49 P. 1049, 40 L.R.A. 
269].) . 
The relevance of evidence that proves crimes other than 
that charged, however, must be examined with care. (People 
v. Albertson, 23 Ca1.2d 550, 577 [145 P.2d 7J; see Stone, 
supra, 46 Harv.L.Rev. 954, 983.) In the present case, the 
question of the admissibility of evidence concerning the 
Denton murder was submitted to the trial court before 
trial, and the court's devision to admit the evidence was 
made after extended argument on the part of counsel. De-
fendant made no request that the jury be admonished at 
the time of the admission of the evidence as to its relevance. 
The court's instructions,· while not models to be followed, 
did not under the circumstances prejudice the defendant. 
·"Evidence has been receh-ed in this case concerning the matter of 
the alleged death of Jacob C. Denton in the year 1920, and some of 
the facts surrounding that transaction including the matter of the 
prosecution of this defendant in connection therewith have been 
mtroduced in evidence. This evidence was not received and should 
not be considered by you as tending to indicate that the defendant is 
the kind Qf a person who, because of the commission of another crime, 
would be more likely to have committed the crime with which she is 
now eharged, and fOI which ahe is now being tried. You must not 
consider such evidence for that purpose. If you find from the evidence 
relating to the laid Denton tralll!8.ction that the defendant was guilty 
of a felonious homicide m connection therewith, you must not permit 
this fact to prejudice you against the defendant. This evidence has 
been received and is to be considered by you only for one or all of the 
following purposes and for no other purpose whatsoever. You may 
consider the evidence relating to the Denton transaction for these 
purposes only: 
"First, for the purpose of determining the motive if any which 
actuated the defendant in the commission of the crime of which she 
is now charged. 
"Secondl for the purpose of determining whether the death of Mar· garet R. LOgan was the result on the one aide of accident or the 
sudden outburst of Mr. Logan, or on the other hand whether the death 
of Margarret R. Logan was the result of design upon the part of this 
defendant. 
"Third, for the purpo~e of determining the identity of the murderer, 
if you find that a murder was committed; that is to say, if a murder 
were committed did the defendant herself plan and commit the murder, 
or was the e1aying accomplished by Mr. Logan, the defendant being 
innocent in the transaction. 
"Fourth, for the purpose of determining whether the murder of 
Margaret R. Logan, if you And the fact to be that she was murdered 
by the defendant, was the result of and a ~rt of a general plan or 
scheme on the part of the defendant of which the death of Jacob C. 
Denton and Margaret R. Logan were both parts. 
"Fifth, for the purpose of showing knowledge as a part of criminal 
intent, and absence of good faith, in connection with acts of this 
defendant prior to, during, and after the death of Margaret It. Logan. 
"If :r- hd that the death of Jacob C. DGton ill ~20 waa aecom-
) 
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[2] Since defendant's conviction was based on the theory 
that Margaret Logan's death was part of a scheme to acquire 
property by murder, proof of such a scheme was essential 
to the prosecution's case. Evidence concerning another offense 
is relevant to prove that a death resulted from the execution of 
a scheme when in the light of the circumstances of the crime 
sought to be proved, it indicates the existence of such a scheme. 
When a defendant's conduct in connection with the previous 
crime bears such similarity in significant respects to his con-
duct in connection wIth the crime charged as naturally to be 
explained as caused by· a general plan, the similarity is not 
merely coincidental, but indicates that· the conduct was di-
rected by design. (See 2 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.) 202, 
275; R. v. Smith, 41 Crim.App.Rep. 229, 236.) In People v. 
Lisenba, 14 Cal.2d 403, 427 [94 P.2d 569], this court held 
that evidence that a former wife of defendant, whose life he 
had insured, had drowned under circumstances tending to 
incriminate the defendant, was· admissible to prove that de-
fendant, in the execution of a scheme of insuring and mur-
dering wives, had murdered a second wife, whom he had also 
insured, and who also drowned under circumstances pointing 
towards defendant's guilt. People v. Gosden, 6 Ca1.2d 14, 24 
[56 P.2d 211], held that evidence that a former wife of de-
fendant had died of strychnine poisoning after defendant had 
insured her life, was admissible to prove that defendant mur-
dered a second wife, whom he had also insured, and who also 
died of strychnine poisoning. In People v. King, 4 Cal.App.2d 
727,731 [41 P.2d 593], it was held that evidence that on two 
prior occasions the two defendants had burglarized or at-
tempted to burglarize apartments of apartment managers by 
a scheme whereby one would burglarize the manager's apart-
ment while the manager was engrossed in conversation with 
the other, was admissible to prove that the burglary charged 
was committed in the ~ecution of such a scheme. (See, also, 
cases cited, People v. King, supra, 4 Cal.App.2d 727, 731 [4] 
plished by the defendant for the purpoSt: of enabling her to acquire 
the property of l18.id Denton, you have a right to consider the circum-
stances prior to, during and after that transaction in connection with 
the matter!! cd motive, plan or scheme, knowledge, accident or design, 
and identity of the perpetrator of the crime charged in the present 
information. If, however, you should find that the defendant did not 
murder Jacob C. Denton, then the evidence connected with that trans-
action ahould be disregarded by you, and you &bould reach your verdict 
upon the other evidence in this cue alone." 
) 
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P.2d 593]; 23 Cal.L.Rev. 530; 2 Wigmore, supra, 275; Fricke, 
supra, 224.) 
The striking similarity in significant respects between de-
fendant's conduct in the Denton case and her conduct in con-
nection with Mrs. Logan's death strongly indicates a scheme 
by defendant to acquire the property of a suitable victim by 
murder. In each case, defendant obtained access to the vic-
tim's home before the murder and responded to inquiries as 
to the decedent's whereabouts by stating that the decedent 
had been injured by a third party, that defendant had since 
been in touch with decedent, that the decedent had gone to' 
one or another part of the country, and had not returned be-, 
cause of self-consciousness caused by the injury. Instead of 
transferring the decedent's assets to the heirs, in each case 
defendant, after decedent's death, treated the decedent's 
residence and personal property as her own: She used the: 
decedent's automobile and made claims of ownership thereto; 
had the decedent's clothing made over for herself or herjl 
daughter; gave away or sold personal property of the de-
cedent that she did not want; went through papers belonging! 
to the decedent; attempted by forgery to acquire decedent's' 
personal property; opened the decedent's mail; stated that 
she was going to buy or sell the decedent's residence and' 
prepared or had prepared instruments purporting to lease. 
or deed the residence to her. After the death of Jacob Denton,! 
she stated that he wanted to conceal his affairs from his: 
friends and relatives. After Mrs. Logan's death, she stated 
that Mrs. Logan intended never to return to her home and' 
no longer wanted the personalty therein. In each case, de-, 
fendant stated that the decedent was shot while she was on' 
the premises, but she did not get in touch with the police.' 
In each case, the condition of the decedent's body, buried 
under or near his residence, indicated that the method of 
killing sought by the assailant was by a bullet from behind 
severing the spinal cord at the neck. In each case, defendant 
gave a detailed explanation of her unusual conduct fol-' 
lowing the disappearance and death of the decedent but 
was discredited. 
The expiration of a number of years between the Denton' 
murder and Mrs. Logan's death is not significant, since 
defendant was in the penitentiary until 1939, and was under 
the supervision of parole authorities after that year. There, 
) 
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was therefore little opportunity for ber to find a suitable 
victim before entering into the employ of the Logans. 
[3] Since the defendant testified that Mrs. Logan was 
killed by her husband, the court properly instructed the 
jury that eviden(..~ concerning the Denton case tended to 
prove that defendant had a motive for killing Mrs. Logan. 
(People v. Gosden, sup1'a,6 Cal.2d 14, 24; People v. Argen-
t08, 156 Ca1. 720, 726 [106 P. 65J; People v. Miller, 121 Cal. 
343, 346 [53 P. 816]), and served to rebut her defense. (See 
People v. Lane, 101 Cal. 513, 517 f36 P. 16]; 13 So.Cal. 
L.Rev. 511, 512.) 
[4] The instruction that the Denton transaction tended to 
identity defendant as the murderer was likewise proper since 
the method by which Jacob Denton was murdered, a bullet 
from behind severing the spinal cord at the neck, produced 
instant death with a minimum of resistance, and tended to 
identify defendant as the one who similarly attempted to 
sever Mrs. [Jogan's spinal cord. (See 2 'Vigmore, supra, 
387.) 
[6] The final purpose for which the jury was allowed to 
consider evidence concerning the Denton case, to show knowl-
edge and absence of good faith on defendant's part, was also 
proper. Since defendant explained that her unusual conduct 
following Margaret Logan's death was designed to obviate 
suspicion that might be engendered by her criminal record, 
evidence that her similar conduct after the murder of Jacob 
Denton aided in her conviction for that murder, tended to 
prove that she knew the incriminating effect of such conduct, 
and that therefore her explanation was false and in bad 
faith. (See People v. Whalen, 154 Cal. 472, 476 [98 P. 194], 
and cases cited; People v. Gosden, supra, 6 Ca1.2d 14, 24.) 
I 
[6] Defendant contends that the court erred in admitting 
evidence of the Denton murder on the ground that section 
1025 of the Penal Code provides that when a defendant who 
pleads not guilty has been charged with a previous conviction 
and admits the charge, "the charge of the previous conviction 
must not be read to the jury, nor alluded to on the trial." A 
previous conviction is charged, however, solely for the informa-
tion of the court and the prison authorities in determining 
the punishment to be imposed in case of conviction. (People 
v. Thomas, 110 Cal. 41, 43 [42 P. 456] ; see Pen. Code, §§ 644, 
66G, 667, 668, 3025.) This section, as well 88 section 1093 of 
) 
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the Penal Code, prevents the circumvention, by reading or 
alluding to the admitted charge in the presence of the jury, 
of the rules against the admission of evidence of a previous 
conviction when such evidence is not relevant or admissible 
to impeach. (See People v. Sa.nsome, 84 Cal. 449, 451 [24 P. 
143] .) It was not designed to exclude relevant evidence n('. 
to prevent the impeachment of a witness by proof of COl). 
viction of a felony. (People v. Oliver, 7 Cal.App. 601, 60.1 
[95 P. 172]; People v. Mullaly, 77 Cal.App. 60, 64 [245 P. 
811]; see People v. Oppenheimer, 156 Cal. 733, 738 [106 P. 
74]; People v. Jeffries, 47 Cal.App.2d 801. 805 [118 P.2d 
190].) 
[7] The judgment roll in the Denton case, consisting of 
the indictment, plea, verdict, proceedings on arraignment for 
judgment, and judgment, were introduced over defendant's 
objection. The prosecution contends that this record was 
admissible as part of the proof that defendant committed a 
crime relevant to present issues, in that it renders defendant's 
guilt thereof res judicata. (See People v. Majado, 22 Cal. 
App.2d 323, 326 [70 P.2d 1015]; 147 A.L.R. 991, 996.) Since, 
however, the prosecution made no objection to defendant's 
testifying that she did not kill Jacob Denton and that she 
did not know whether he was dead, and requested no in-
struction that his death at defendant's hands was established 
asa matter of law, defendant's guilt of Denton's murder was 
not treated below as res judicata. The record of the judg-
ment was admissible in any event to impeach defendant's 
testimony (Code Civ. Proc., § 2051; People v. Booth, 72 
Cal.App. 160, 166 [236 P. 987]), and the court emphasized 
in its instructions that this evidence was to be considered for 
this purpose. 
[8] Although when ,no judgment has been pronounced, a 
conviction may be proved by the record of the verdict (People 
v. Ward, 134 Cal. 301, 307 [66 P. 372]), when a judgment 
has been rendered, the record thereof establishes the pre-
vious conviction beyond dispute, and the record of the earlier 
proceedings is cumulative. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1838, 
2044; People v. Peak, 66 Cal.App.2d 894, 913 [153 P.2d 
464].) Defendant was not prejudiced by the introduction 
of the record of proceedings preceding the judgment in the 
Denton case, however, for these proceedings added little 
information to that related in the judgment. 
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objection evidence that the Denton case was affirmed on 
appeal and to permit the prosecution to elicit this infor-
mation from her on cross-examination. Affirmation on ap-
peal is relevant, however, to a determination of the weight 
to be given a previous conviction. (See People v. Hardwick, 
204 Cal. 582, 589 [269 P. 427, 59 A.L.R. 1480].) Such a 
conviction may be shown by examination of the witness 
to impeach him. (Code Civ. Proc .• § 2051.) 
[10] Defendant, while being cross-examined as to her 
previous conviction, stated of her own volition that she was 
prevented by force from testifying in the Denton case. It is 
contended that error was committed in overruling an objec-
tion to cross-examination concerning this statement. Although 
the prosecution may not, in impeaching a witness by prov-
ing a previous conviction inquire as to the merits of the 
conviction (People v. David, 12 Cal.2d 639, 646 [86 P.2d 
811]; People v. Eldridge, 147 Cal. 782, 786 [82 P. 442]; 
People v. Chin Hane, 108 Cal. 597, 606 [41 P. 697]), de-
fendant's testimony tended to mitigate the discrediting effect 
of the Denton conviction. and could not have been prejudicial. 
[11] Defendant contendR that the court erred in exclud-
ing a verified petition by Margaret Logan executed in con-
nection with her husband's commitment in November of 
1943. The petition recited that Arthur Logan "has threat-
ened to burn down the house, and has also threatened to kill 
me and himself. He struck me a week ago with his fist and my 
face is still bruised from the assault. He cannot be controlled 
or managed and needs supervision and care." The petition 
was hearsay and inadmissible to prove that these recitals 
were true. (People v. Willard, 150 Cal. 543, 548 [89 P. 124]; 
People v. Lee, 108 Cal.App. 609. 612 [291 P. 887]; Adkins v. 
Brett, 184 Cal. 252, 256 [J.93 P. 251]; see 5 Wigmore, 3'Upra, 
76.) Defendant contendR that it was nevertheless admissible 
to support her defense that Arthur Logan was the assailant 
in that it indicated that Mrs. Logan feared her husband and 
believed him dangerous. The petition was offered, however, 
before defendant testified that Mr. Logan was the assailant, 
and was excluded on the ground that Mrs. Logan's state of 
mind toward her husband was not in issue. Although the 
right to offer it later without the necessity of an authenticat-
ing witness was reserved, the petition was not again offered. 
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prove Mrs. Logan's state of mind, it is improbable that had 
it been admitted the jury would have inferred that Mrs. 
Logan feared a murderous attack by her husband. The jury 
was informed of the nature of the petition by recitals in a 
final judgment admitted in evidence declaring Arthur Logan 
insane and ordering his commitment. The judgment recited 
that Margaret Logan on November 8, 1943, testified "in re-
gard to the mental condition of said person . . ." and that 
on the basis of this testimony and that of two medical ex-
aminers, Arthur Logan was found "dangerously mentally 
ill," and that unless he was given supervision, he "may en-
danger health, person and property .... " Defendant ad-
mitted, moreover, that Mrs. Logan's reason for procuring her 
husband's commitment was the hope that he would be cured. 
Testimony of other witnesses revealed that Mr. Logan had 
been weakened by a major operation, and was very feeble. 
Defendant, who was present when the petition was prepared 
by a Los Angeles County deputy clerk from statements by ! 
Mrs. Logan, testified that because Mrs. Logan did not know 
the procedure. she aided her in procuring the commitment; 
that Mrs. Logan told defendant that the bruise on Mrs. 
Logan's face, referred to in the petition, was in fact caused 
by her husband's tripping her; that Mrs. Logan regretted 
filing the petition, wept, and stated that she would never 
again place her husband in an institution. 
The judgment and the order denying the motion for a new 
trial are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., eoncurred. 
CARTER, J.-I diss~t. In my opinion it was error to 
admit in evidence the matters pertaining to commission of 
the crime of 1920. In view of the volume of this evidence 
and the circumstantial nature of the proof as a whole, it 
. cannot be said that the defendant was not prejudiced. 
It is the settled policy of the law of this state to give effect 
to the universally recognized general rule of exclusion under 
which a defendant may be tried for no offense other than 
that with which he is charged (8 Cal.Jur. § 167, p. 58; People 
v. Albertson, 23 Ca1.2d 550, 576 [145 P.2d 7]; see, also, 
Wharton's Crim. Evidence, §§ 343, 344, pp. 483 et seq.; 20 
Am.Jur. § 309, p. 287; 22 C.J.S. § 682, pp. 1084 et seq.) This 
... ) 
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rule and the reasons for it are well stated in the leading case 
of People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 291 [61 N.E. 286, 293; 
62 L,R.A. 193] : "The general rule of evidence applicable to 
criminal trials is that the state cannot prove against a de-
fendant any crime not alleged in the indictment, either as a 
foundation for a separate punishment, or as aiding the proofs 
that he is guilty of the crime charged. (1 Bishop's New 
erim. Pro. soo. 1120.) This rule, so universally recognized 
and so firmly established in all English-speaking lands, is 
rooted in that jealous regard for the liberty of the individual 
which has distinguished our jurisprudence from all others, at 
least from the birth of Magna Charta. It is the product of 
that same humane and enlightened public spirit which, speak. 
ing through our common law, has decreed that every person 
charged with the commission of a crime shall be protected 
by the presumption of innocence until he has been proven 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This rule, and the reasons 
upon which it rests, are so familiar to every student of our 
law that they need be referred to for no other purpose than to 
point out the exceptions thereto. The rule itself has been 
stated and discussed in this court in a number of cases. 
but we will cite only a few. In People v. Sharp (107 N.Y. 427 
[14 N.E. 319, 1 Am.St.Rep. 851]) it was said: "The general 
rule is that when a man is put upon trial for one offense he is 
to be convicted, if at all, by evidence which shows that he is 
guilty of that offense alone, and that, under ordinary circum-
stances, proof of his guilt of one or a score of other offenses 
in his lifetime is wholly excluded.' In Coleman v. People 
(55 N.Y. 81) it is laid down as follows: 'The general rule 
is against receiving evidence of another offense. A person 
cannot be convicted of one offense upon proof that he commit-
t.ed another, however persuasive in a moral point of view 
such evidence may be. It would be easier to believe a person 
guilty of one crime if it was known that he had committed 
another of a similar character, or, indeed, of any character; 
but the injustice of such a rule in courts of justice is apparent. 
It would lead to convictions, upon the particular charge made, 
by proof of other acts in no way connected with it, and to 
uniting evidence of several offenses to produce conviction 
for a single once.' 
"In People v. Shea (147 N.Y. 78 [41 N.E. 505]) the rule is 
thus stated: "The impropriety of giving evidence showing 
) 
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that the accused had been guilty of other crimes merely for 
the purpose of thereby inferring his guilt of the crime for 
which he is on trial may be said to have been assumed and 
consistently maintained by the English courts ever since the 
common law has itself been in existence. Two antagonistic. 
methods for the judicial investigation of crime and the con-
duct of criminal trials have existed for many years. One of 
these methods favors this kind of evidence in order that the 
tribunal which is engaged in the trial of the accused may 
have the benefit of the light to be derived from a record of his 
whole past life, his tendencies, his nature, his associates, his 
practices, and in fine all the facts which go to make up the 
life of a human being. This is the method which is pursued 
in France, and it is claimed that entire justice is more apt 
to be done where such a course is pursued than where it is 
omitted. The common law of England, however, has adopted 
another, and, so far as the party accused is concerned, a much 
more merciful doctrine. By that law the criminal is to be pre-
sumed innocent until his guilt is made to appear beyond a 
reasonable doubt to a jury of twelve men. In order to prove 
his guilt it is not permitted to show his former character or to 
prove his guilt of other crimes, merely for the purpose of rais-
ing a presumption that he who wolild commit them would be 
more apt to commit the crime in question.' • . • The court of 
last resort in Pennsylvania thus states the rule: 'It is the 
general rule that a distinct crime unconnected with that laid 
in the indictment cannot be given in evidence against a pris-
oner. It is not proper to raise a presumption of guilt on the 
ground that having committed one crime, the depravity it ex-
hibits makes it likel;r he would commit another. Logically, . 
the commission of an independent offense is not proof in itself 
of the commission of another crime. Yet it cannot be said to 
be without influence on the mind, for certainly if one be 
shown to be guilty of another crime equally heinous, it will 
prompt a more ready belief that he might have committed 
the one with which he llI. charged; it, therefore, predisposes 
the mind of the juror to believe the prisoner guilty.' (Shaff-
ner v. Common.wealth, 72 Pa.St. 60 [13 Am.Rep. 649].)" 
After thus reviewing the general rule, the court in the 
:M:olineux case discusses the applicability of various excep-
tions, saying: "The exceptions to the rule cannot be stated 
with categorical precision. GeneralIy speaking, evidence of 
other crimes is competent to prove the speci:fic crime charged 
) 
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when it tends to establish (1) motive; (2) intent; (3) the 
absence of mistake or accident; (4) a common scheme or plan 
embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related 
to each other that proof of one tends to establish the others; 
(5) the identity of the person charged with the commission 
of the crime on trial. (Wharton on Crim. Ev. [9th ed.] sec. 
48;' Underhill on Ev. sec. 58; Abbott's Trial Brief, Crim. 
Trials, sec. 598.)" 
First, as to motive, it is pointed out that "in every criminal 
trial when proof of motive is an essential ingredient of the 
evidence against a defendant, the motive to be established is 
the one which induced the commission of the crime charged. 
This is too simple for discussion. To hold otherwise would be 
to sanction the violation of the general rule under the guise 
of an exception to it." In the present case, the motive which 
prompted the crime charged, if defendant committed that 
crime, W8.q to acquire for herself the property of her victim, 
or to prevent the victim from reporting the forgery of the 
check or other misconduct. In either case the fact of the 1920 
murder was of no probative value in establishing the motive 
for the later crime. Because of the large percentage of crime..o; 
committed for the purpose of feloniously acquiring property 
of another. that ~imilarity of motive alone is not sufficient 
to warrant application of the exception to the general rule. 
Second, as to intent, which is distinguishable from motive, it 
is obvious that proof of an intent to kill Denton in 1920 was of 
DI) probative value in establishing an intent to kin another 
nt a different time. 
Third, under the facts it is clear, and indeed there is no 
contention to the contrary, that the exception relating to the 
"s hi;ence"of"mista:ke or ~ccident has no application. 
Fourth, as to plan or scheme, it is said in the Molineux 
case. that "To bring a case within this exception to the gen-
eral rule which excludes proof of extraneous crimes, there 
must be evidence of system between the offense on trial and 
the one sought to be introduced. They must be connected as 
parts of a general and composite plan or scheme, or they must 
be so related to each other as to show a common motive or 
intent running through both ..•. Some connection between 
the crimes must be shown to have existed in fact and in the 
mind of the actor, uniting them for the accomplishment of a 
common purpose, before such evidence can be received. This 
/) 
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connection must clearly appear from the evidence. Whether 
any connection exists is a judicial question. If the court does 
not clearly perceive it, the accused should be given the 
benefit of the doubt and the evidence rejected. The minds 
of the jurors must not be poisoned and prejudiced by re-
ceiving evidence of this irrelevant and dangerous description." 
Applying this test to the pre.qent facts, it is seen that there 
is no evidence of common purpose, plan; or scheme. At 
most the prosecution showed that two isolated murders were 
committed, with twenty-four years intervening between them, 
for the apparent purpose in each case of securing the vic-
tim's property. The death of both victims was not a means 
to a single goal. 
Lastly, as to the exception covering identity, it is said in 
the Molineux case: "There are not many reported cases in 
which this exception seems to have been affirmatively applied. 
A far larger number of cases, while distinctly recognizing 
its existence, have held it inapplicable to the particular facts 
then before the court. The reason for this is obvious. In the 
nature of things there cannot be many cases where evidence 
of separate and distinct crimes, with no unity or connection 
of motive, intent or plan, will serve to legally identify the 
person who committed one as the same person who is guilty 
of the other. The very fact that it is much easier to believe in 
the guilt of an accused person when it is known or suspected 
that he has previously committed a similar crime proves the 
dangerous tendency of such evidence to convict, not upon the 
evidence of the crime charged. but upon the superadded evi-
dence of the previous crime. Hence our courts have been 
proverbially careful to subject such evidence to the most 
rigid scrutiny, and,have invariably excluded it in cases where 
its relevancy and competency was not clearly shown. As was 
said in People v. Sharp (107 N.Y. 471 [14 N.E. 319, 1 Am.St. 
Rep. 851]) such evidencE' 'tends necessarily and directly to 
load the prisoner down with separate and distinct charges' of 
past crime, which it cannot be supposed he is or will be in 
proper condition to meet or explain, and which necessarily 
tend to very gravely prejudice him in the minds of the jury 
upon the question of his guilt or innocence.' Such evidence 
gives opportunity for the conviction of an accused person upon 
mere prejudice instead of by evidence showing the actual 
commission of the crime for which a defendant is on trial. 
It eompels a defendant to meet an accusation not charged in 
) 
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the indictment, which he might successfully refute if given 
the opportunity to do so, unembarrassed by other issues." In 
the present case the defendant was admittedly at the scene of 
the murder. The only issue wa...c:; whetller it was she or Mr. 
Logan who struck the blows and fired the fatal shot. How evi-
dence of the 1920 crime could prove her identity rather than 
that of Mr. Logan as the murderer is obscure. unless it can 
be said that the two crimes show a ('ommon plan or scheme. 
But. as already stated, no common plan appears other than 
perhaps a purpose to feloniously acquire property of the 
victim, and that is not a sufficient connection to justify 
application of the exception to the general rule. 
The development of the law in this state shows a departure 
from the early restrictions governing the application of ex-
ceptions to the general rule as defined in the Molineux case. 
This is evidenced by decisions such as People v. Lisenba, 14 
Ca1.2d 403 f94 P.2d 569], and cases there reviewed (see dis-
Renting opinion reported in volume 89 2d of the Pacific Re-
porter at page..c:; 54-108). Tn my opinion the pendulum haH 
RWUDg too far to the side of admissibility. The restrictions 
Rhould be reappraised and given effect. As said in People v. 
Albertson., 23 Ca1.2d 550, 577 f145 P.2d 7] : "The trial court, 
however, should be guided by the rule that such proof is to be 
received with 'extreme caution,' and if its connection with the 
crime charged is not clearly perceived, the doubt is to bE' 
resolved in favor of the accused, instead of suffering the 
minds of t.he jurors to be prejudiced by an independent fact. 
carrying with it no proper evidence of the particular guilt." 
(See, also, People v. mass, ]58 Cal. 650 f112 P. 281]; People 
v. Lane, 100 Cal. 379. 3$7-390 [34 P. 856]; People v. Darby, 
64 Cal.App.2d 25 [148 P.2d 281; 13 Ca1.Jur. § 84, p. 707; 
8 Cal.Jur. § 168, p. 61.) 
An indication of the policy of this state to adhere to a lim-
ited application of the exceptions to the general rule is found 
in section 1025 of the Penal Code, enacted in 1874, which pro-
vides that when a defendant who pleads not guilty has becn 
charged with a previous conviction and admits the charge. 
"the charge of the previous conviction must not be read to the 
jury, nor alluded to on the tria!''' Although, as the majority 
opinion notes, this statute, as construed and applied, does not 
exclude relevant evidence, or prevent the impeachment of a 
witness by proof of conviction of a felony, nevertheless thi!': 
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court just recently took occasion to comment at length on the 
prejudice which is thrust upon any defendant charged with 
crime who has been previously convicted of a felony (People 
v. Adamson, 27 Ca1.2d 478, 494 [165 P.2d 3]). So far as 
possible the settled policy underlying the enactment should 
be given effect (see People v. Sansome, 84 Cal. 449, 451 [24 P. 
143]; People v. Hobbs, 37 Ca1.App.2d 8. 11 f98 P.2d 775]), 
and the application of exceptions to the general rule should be 
confined to the narrow field laid down in early cases. 
The issue of remoteness is an important one. The proxim-
ity of the offense charged to the prior offense sought to be 
introduced in evidence is universally considered by the courts 
in determining whether such evidence is admiRSible (63 
A.L.R. 602; 22 C.J.S. §§ 683-689, pp. 1089-1111; 1 Wharton'!! 
Criminal Evidence (11th ed.) § 361, p. 569; 8 Cal.Jur. § 170, 
p. 65). Generally it must appear that the evidence of other 
offenses relates to acts that occurred shortly before, or shortly 
after, the commission of the offense for which the accused is 
being tried. However, no definite time limit can be fixed, 
and the matter rests largely in the discretion of the court. 
The California Jurisprudence text writer l'Itates: "In regard 
to the distance of time between the principal fact and the 
collateral fact to be shown in proof of knowledge or intent. 
no precise rule can be established so far as the admissibility 
of the evidence is concerned. If the principle upon which thiq 
evidence is introduced is the doctrine of chances or probabili-
ties, the remoteness of such occurrences in point of time goes 
to the weight rather than the admissibility of the evidence. In 
such cases, if the evidence has any application under the rule. 
whether or not it has sufficient weight to entitle it to be sub-
mitted to the jury is a question for the trial court. The ques-
tion must be left in a great measure to the discretion of the 
judge who tries the case." (8 Cal.Jur. § 170, p. 66.) 
Under this rule, it appears that in this case the mere fact 
of extreme remoteness did not compel the exclusion of evi-
dence of the prior offense by the trial judge. However, when it 
is considered that twenty-four years elapsed between the two 
crimes, eighteen of which were spent by the defendant in 
prison with ample time for reflection, it is at least arguable 
that even had she originally intended to murder a second vic-
tim, she would hardly have planned to carry out the crime 
by the same method which had resulted so disastrously for her 
in the first instance. In other words, the fact of remoteness, 
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considered with all of the other facts in this case, negatives 
any common plan and supports the conclusion that the trial 
court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the 
prior offense. 
In my opinion the defendant should be retried on evi-
dence confined to the commission of the offense with which 
she is here charged. 
For the foregoing reason I would reverse the judgment. 
Appelant's petition for a rehearing was denied July 2, 
1946. Carter, J., voted for a rehearing. 
